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NOTES
TAX TREATMENT OF LOSSES ON SECURITIES
ACQUIRED IN THE NORMAL COURSE OF BUSINESS
Taxpayers, whether they be corporate or individual, often find
themselves in circumstances wherein it becomes necessary to acquire
securities for purposes other than investment. This may occur
when securities are purchased as a condition precedent to obtaining
other property, when they are required as a deposit to secure
contract performance, or when they are received by a taxpayer for
goods sold or services performed. Often the terms and circumstances
under which these securities are acquired are such that upon their
sale a loss is extremely probable. The problem that arises is whether
securities so acquired take on the same character as the underlying
transaction which required their acquisition, or whether they retain
their character as capital assets irrespective of some other basic
purpose in their procurement. The question is hardly moot since
the solution to this problem determines whether a loss is limited as a
capital loss,1 or, on the other hand, whether it is deductible in full.2
The "capital gain" provision of the tax structure, which was
first introduced into the federal revenue legislation by the 1921 Act,'
was originally intended to exempt from high surtaxes profits of indi-
viduals derived from the sale or exchange of capital assets which had
increased in value over a period of two years or more.4 Although
this original purpose seems to have been completely invalidated
when the holding period required for capital gains treatment was
reduced to six months, 5 the capital gains provisions still play a
major part in present income tax legislation. The 1921 Act had
no provisions restricting the deductibility of capital losses, but such
restrictions arose shortly thereafter in the 1924 Act." The purpose
1. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1211. Limitation on Capital Losses.-(a)
Corporations-In the case of a corporation, losses from sales or exchanges of
capital assets shall be allowed only to the extent of gains from such sales or
exchanges. (b) Other Taxpayers.-In the case of a taxpayer other than a
corporation, losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets shall be allowed
only to the extent of the gains from such sales or exchanges, plus the taxable
income of the taxpayer or $1,000, whichever is smaller.
2. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162.
3. Revenue Act of 1921, § 206, 42 Stat. 232. Under the 1918 Act and
previous laws, the profits on sales of capital assets were taxed at the regular
normal and surtax rates in the year of realization.
4. See 3 Mertens, Federal Income Taxation, § 22.02 (1942).
5. The Revenue Act of 1942, § 150(a), 56 Stat. 843 provided for this
change by striking out "18 months" and inserting in lieu thereof "6 months."
6. Revenue Act of 1924, § 208(c), 43 Stat. 263. This act limited the
deduction for losses sustained by one other than a corporation upon the sale
or exchange of capital assets held over two years to a maximum credit against
the tax upon ordinary net income of 1211,,% of such loss.
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of these limitations was to put the deductibility of capital losses- on
somewhat the same basis as the taxability of capital gains. How-
ever, the 1934 Act abandoned the previous theory of taxing capital
gains separately and provided that capital gains and losses were
to be taken into account in computing net income.$ The limitation
on capital losses was also changed to allow their deductibility to the
extent of $2,000 plus the amount of gains from the sales or ex-
changes of capital assets.9 This limitation has remained in one
form or another down to the present law10 and is the limitation
taxpayers are forced to avoid in order to obtain full deduction for
losses sustained on security transactions which they contend occur
in the ordinary course of business. Taxpayers have attempted to
avoid this restriction on the deductibility of such security losses by
several methods. These have varied from labeling the loss part of the
goods sold, to classifying them as ordinary and necessary business
expenses, with an occasional taxpayer contending his loss was de-
ductible as a business loss not compensated for by insurance or
otherwise.
Capital assets are defined not by what they are, but rather what
they are not. It describes not the doughnut but the hole, so to speak,
by enumerating certain classes of property, the sale of which gives
rise to ordinary income and provides that all other property falls
into the 'capital asset" category." Ordinarily, securities are con-
sidered to be capital assets unless they are in the hands of a dealer.22
Nevertheless, courts will occasionally attach different labels to
7rt. See 1939-1 Cum. Bull. 255, § 208(c). See also the Supplemental Re-
port on Capital Gains and Losses to Joint Committee on Internal Revenue
Taxation (1929) at 2, quoted in Hendricks, Federal Income Tax: Capital
Gains and Losses, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 262, 266 (1935), where it is stated, "The
tax on capital gains should approximate the tax which would have been paid
if the gain had been realized in uniform annual amounts over the period during
which the asset was held. In the same way, the reduction in tax due to capital
losses should approximate the reduction in tax which would have resulted if
the loss had been incurred uniformly over a period during which the asset
was held."
8. Revenue Act of 1934, § 117(a), 48 Stat. 714.
9. Revenue Act of 1937, § 117(d), 48 Stat 715.
10. The Int. Rev. Code of 1939, 53 Stat. 869, § 212, amended Int. Rev.
Code, § 117(d), and removed the $2,000 limitation previously applicable to the
capital losses of corporation. The present law, Int. Rev. Code of 1954.§ 1211 provides that in the case of corporations capital losses shall be allowed
only to the extent of capital gains. Taxpayers other than corporations are
allowed losses to the extent of gains from such sales, plus the taxable income
of the taxpayer, or $1,000, whichever is smaller. However, in both cases,
Section 1212 allows a net capital loss of one year to be carried over for the
next 5 years as a short-term capital loss, deductible to the extent that it ex-
ceeds any net capital gains of such year.
11. Int Rev. Code of 1954, § 1221, (formerly) Int Rev. Code of 1939,
§ 117(a), as amended, 64 Stat 932 (1950).
12. Ibid.
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certain securities which are not the stock in trade of a dealer, and
find completely different consequences to flow from their sale.
SECURITIES ACQUIRED TO GUARANTEE CONTRACT PERFORMANCE
One of the more recent cases in this borderline area is Conis-
sioner v. Bagley & Sewall Co.,' 8 which involved a security purchase
as a necessary requisite to an ordinary business transaction. That
company, which was engaged in the manufacture and sale of paper-
making machinery, was required to deposit $800,000 of United
States bonds, in lieu of a surety bond, to guarantee performance of
a contract to sell two large paper-making machines. The taxpayer
owned no such bonds at the time, and was forced to purchase the
bonds at a premium. The interest earned upon the bonds during the
period they were held in escrow was reported as income received
by the taxpayer. Upon release from escrow they were sold at a
loss, which was deducted as an ordinary and necessary business ex-
pense. The taxpayer contended "that the whole transaction [was]
merely an incident required and made necessary in the performance
of a contract undertaken in the regular course of the taxpayer's busi-
ness and [was] deductible from gross income in its entirety by
reason of the provision of Section 23(a) (1) (A) 14 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939."'Il The Commissioner contended that "the
bonds constituted capital assets, as the term is defined in Section
117(a) (1)16 of the Internal Revenue Code and that the loss sus-
tained upon their sale [was] to be treated as a capital loss to the
extent of offsetting capital gains, none of which [were] reported by
the taxpayer and therefore the whole item [was] subject to elimi-
nation.' '7
The Tax Court felt compelled to find that the property was not
a capital asset, but fell within the category of "property held ...
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or
business."' 8 In labeling the securities as "held primarily for sale
to customers in the ordinary course of business," the Tax Court
13. 221 F. 2d 944 (2d Cir. 1955).
14. The section provides in part, "In computing net income there shall
be allowed as deductions . . . all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid
or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business. ..
Now Int. -Rev. Code of 1954, § 162.
15. Commissioner v. Bagley & Sewall Co., 221 F. 2d 944, 946 (2d Cir.
1955).
16. Now Int Rev. Code of 1954, § 1221.
17. Commissioner v. Bagley & Sewall Co., 221 F. 2d 944, 946 (2d Cir.
1955).
18. Bagley & Sewall Co., 20 T. C. 983, 989 (1953), referring to hit.
Rev. Code of 1939, § 117(a) (1) (A), as amended, 64 Stat. 932 (1950) (now
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1221 (1)).
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had classified these particular securities as non-capital and had ac-
complished the result it wanted. However, the court went on to
fortify its decision by talking in terms of the loss constituting "an
'ordinary and reasonable expense." The court of appeals referred to
it as a "business expense." The phrase, "property held by the tax-
payer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his
trade or business," was dearly not intended to be construed as the
Tax Court here used it. This exception was added in 192410 and
amended into its present form in 193420 by adding the words "to
customers" and "ordinary." The terminology was designed to
cover the transactions of "dealers in securities" and to make clear
the fact that property held for resale was not a capital asset. - Prob-
ably a better rational would have been to term the loss a part of the
cost of goods or services sold, on an ordinary and necessary business
- expense, 22 without considering the transaction as a separate sale.
In so doing the court could have held that the security purchase
was so tied to the contract that it was impossible to divide or atomize
the transaction into its component parts so as to treat each part
separately.23.Therefore, inasmuch as the entire transaction was part
of the taxpayer's normal course of business any gain or loss on any
part of the component parts of the transaction would be ordinary
19. Revenue Act of 1924, § 208 (a) (8), 43 Stat 263.
20. Revenue Act of 1934, § 117(b), 48 Stat 714.
21. The House Report on the 1924 Act, H. R. Rep. No. 179, 68th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 19 (1924), quoted in 3 Mertens, Federal Income Taxation, § 22.08
n. 68, states: "The last part of the definition of capital assets is changed to
remove any doubt as to whether property which is held primarily for resale
constitutes a capital assets, whether or not it is the type of property which
under good accounting practice would be included in the inventory." The
1921 Act did not exclude property "held by the taxpayer primarily for sale
in the course of his trade or-business" from the definition of capital assets.
Revenue Act of 1921, § 206(a) (6).
22. See Welch v. Helvering, 290 U. S. 111, 113-114 (1933) where it is
said, "... [W]hat is ordinary, though there must always be a strain of con-
stancy within it, is none the less a variable affected by time and place and
circumstances. Ordinary in this context does not mean that the payments
must be habitual or normal in the sense that the same taxpayer will have to
make them often. ... The situation is unique in the life of the individual
affected, but not in the life of the group, the community, of which he is a
part." Also in A. Harris & Co. v. Lucas, 48 F. 2d 187, 188 (5th Cir. 1931)
it is said, ".. [Ilt is clear that Congress intended the statute [ordinary and
necessary expenses] to be broadly construed to facilitate business generally,
so that any necessary expense, not actually a capital investment, incurred m
good faith in a particular business, is to be considered an ordinary expense of
that business.'
23. For cases in other contexts where courts have refused to divide
transactions into their component parts see, e.g., Mather v. Commissioner,
149 F. 2d 393 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U. S. 767 (1945) ; Helvering v.
New Haven & S. L. R. Co., 121 F. 2d 985 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315
U. S. 803 (1942); Commissioner v. Ashland Oil & Refining Co., 99 F. 2d
588 (6th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U. S. 661 (1939); Prairie Oil & Gas
Co. v. Motter, 66 F. 2d 309 (10th Cir. 1933).
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income or ordinary expense, rather than gain or loss from the sale
or exchange of a capital asset. Such a construction, in turn, would
avoid the question of the extent to which these holders of non-capital
securities would be treated as "dealers. ' 24 It appears this was what
the circuit court was doing when it analogized the cost of the bonds
deposited in this case to the premiums paid surety companies by
regular contracting companies, but it affirmed the Tax Court's
decision without making the point clear.
SECURITIES ACQUIRED AS A REQUISITE TO OBTAINING SCARCE
MERCHANDISE
The chief cases relied on in the Bagley case lie in a somewhat
different category, although they concern essentially the same
problem. In both the Charles A. Clark25 and the Western Wine and
Liquor Co. 26 cases, the taxpayers were in the business of buying
and selling liquor. When a national distilling company announced
that it planned to sell its liquor inventory' at book cost to its stock-
holders in relation to their shareholdings, both taxpayers purchased
stock with the avowed purpose of obtaining an allotment of liquor.
In both cases the losses on the sale of stock were added to the cost
of liquor, and included as part of the cost of goods sold. Again the
court held that the stock must be considered as held by the taxpayer
for sale in the regular course of its business of buying and selling
liquor.2 7 Again it was Section 117(a) (1) (A) 28 that was applied to
transform capital assets into non-capital assets.
Several factors appear to be controlling in the Western Wine Co.
case which preceded the Clark case. First of all, the taxpayer dis-
posed of its stock almost immediately, which although not conclu-
sive was given considerable weight. Secondly, the transaction was
handled on the books as part of the cost of whiskey rather than as an
investment and this theory was followed all the way through the
transaction. Thirdly, the court was further impressed with the
genuineness of the transaction inasmuch as the company in which
the stock was purchased was so financially unsound. The last con-
tentions made to the court, although somewhat weaker, urged the
24. U. S. Treas. Reg. 118 § 39.22 (c)-5 (1953) permits dealers in securi-
ties to value unsold securities (a) at cost (b) at cost or market, whichever
is lower, or (c) at market value.
25. Charles A. Clark, 19 T. C. 48 (1952), superseding 18 T. C. No. 106
(1952).
26. Western Wine and Liquor Co., 18 T. C. 1090 (1952).
27. Charles A. Clark, 19 T. C. 48 (1952) ; Western Wine and Liquor
Co., 18 T. C. 1090 (1952).
28. Now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1221(1).
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absolute necessity of acquiring the liquor for the continuance of
the taxpayer's business, and the presumption that the stock pur-
chase was a necessary incident to the purchase of the liquor since
liquor was offered in the same ratio as the number of shares pur-
chased.
The dissent in the above case presented several bothersome
questions:
(1) "... Where would the same reasoning lead us if circum-
stances were such that the stock was sold at a profit[ ?] "-'
(2) "... [A] ssume the stock was held for more than a year
during which time the whiskey was all disposed of by petitioner and
the tax returns had been filed accounting for the same, to what item
of petitioner's accounting for such later year would the gain or loss
be attached as part of the cost of goods sold[ ?]"30
(3) "... [H)ow can [the majority] either directly or by neces-
sary inference hold that the stock was sold to customers in the
ordinary course of his business? Petitioner was in the whiskey busi-
ness, not in the business of buying and selling securities. Its cus-
tomers were customers for whiskey, not customers for securities."'3
- All three queries are reasonable and point out some of the prob-
lems that may arise by such statutory construction of a Code section
not designed to cover these situations. It appears, however, that
each question has a reasonable solution. As to the first question, it is
rather doubtful that the situation will arise where a taxpayer will
receive a gain on stock purchased under these circumstances. How-
ever, should such a situation arise where a gain is realized, nothing
more serious would result than'requiring the taxpayer to prove
his holding of the stock as an investment to classify it as a capital
asset or else have the gain subjected to ordinary income rates.3-
Thus, in either instance, by placing the burden of proof upon the
taxpayer as to his motives in acquiring the securities, it appears that
a fair result could be reached. As to the second query of matching
revenue and expense for accounting purposes, the value of the
securities could be determined at the year's end just as dealers in
29. Western Wine and Liquor Co., 18 T. C. 1090, 1100 (1952) (dis-
senting opinion).
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. See Harry Dunitz, 7 T. C. 672 (1946) where this problem did arise.
The Tax Court applied the test as to the reason the securities were acquired,
found them to be acquired as a component part of their ordinary trade or
business, and taxed the income as ordinary income.
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securities value their stock inventory.88 Any writedown could be
taken then through the inventory, with subsequent adjustments
made later. The third question harks back to the problem that runs
all through these cases of how such a tortured construction of a
statute can be justified. Of course, it is only the result that can
justify such a construction. As pointed out, the court could have
employed a more direct reasoning to reach the same conclusion,
but has successfully reached the desired result by somewhat stretch-
ing its imagination.
In Hogg v. Allen,34 another case in which shares of stock were
purchased to acquire whiskey, the court employed another line of
thought. In that case the court allowed the loss on the sale of the
stock as an ordinary and necessary expense incurred in carrying
on trade and business,3 5 or as a loss not compensated for by insur-
ance or otherwise.3 8 Although the court did not specify on which
of these two grounds it was recognizing the deduction, it appears
that allowing it as an ordinary and necessary business expense
would have been a sound rationale, but to classify the deduction as
a loss not compensated for by insurance or otherwise seems almost
as far afield as 117(a) (1) (A). 7
SECURITIES PURCHASED TO OBTAIN A CONCESSION
The Exposition Souvenir Corp. case3" at first seems to be
entirely inconsistent with the foregoing cases, but upon closer ex-
amination appears to be clearly distinguishable. The taxpayer in
that case as a condition precedent to obtaining concessions at the
New York World's Fair purchased Fair debentures for cash. The
debentures were treated as investments on the taxpayer's books and
in its tax return. Interest paid on the bonds was reported as income
and payments made on account of principal were shown as reduc-
33. See note 24 mipra. If the court is going to classify these taxpayers as
"dealers" for purposes of taking the securities out of the capital asset cate-
gory, it does not seem to be unreasonable to allow these same "dealers" to
value their securities as regular dealers in securities are allowed to do. This
would at least prevent any gain, if such occur, from being taxed at capital
gains rates. It might provide the taxpayer with an opportunity to take the
loss when he gets the largest benefit, however, since he can use market value
to get the loss in the first year, or use cost to postpone the loss until later.34. 105 F. Supp. 12 (M.D. Ga. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 214 F. 2d
640 (5th Cir. 1954).
35. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23(a) (1) (A), as amended, 66 Stat. 443(1952) (now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162(a)).
36. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23(f), 53 Stat. 13 (now Int. Rev. Code of
1954, § 165(a)).
37. Now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1221(1).
38. Exposition Souvenir Corporation v. Commissioner, 163 F. 2d 283(2d Cir. 1947).
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tions in the amount of investment. The taxpayer contended the
debentures as "property" fell within the exceptions as (1) "prop-
erty held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of his trade or business" 39 or (2) "property used
in the trade or business, of a character which is subject to the
allowance for depreciation 4 0 or, finally that it should be treated
as additional consideration to obtain a concession 4' and therefore
an ordinary and necessary business expense. The court rejected all
three contentions and resorted to the plain wordf of the statute in
justifying its holding that the loss was a long-term capital loss.
This result, however, which is contrary to the holding in the
whiskey cases where the loss on the securities was held deductible
in full, appears to be distinguishable for the following reasons. First
of all, the taxpayer filed his tax return originally treating the deben-
tures therein as investment securities, and secondly, his books
treated the securities throughout as an investment. The court was
unwilling to allow the taxpayer to reverse his position when the tax
consequences became obvious, but the court did seem to indicate
that it might have been willing to allow allocation of the cost be-
tween the debentures and the concession contract,42 had there been
sufficient evidence as to the debentures' market value at the date of
purchase.4 3 A further factor and probably equally significant was the
extended holding period which continued even after the securities
fulfilled their avowed purpose of obtaining a concession. Neverthe-
less, had the taxpayer taken the position on its tax return and
records that it held in the litigation it is highly possible that the
court would have reached the same result it reached in the Bagley,
Clark, and Western Wine cases.
SECURITIES ACQUIRED TO ImPRovE BusINEss CONDITIONS
AND RELATIONS
In Coninissionwr v. The Hub, I7c.,44 a clothing corporation
made several payments on a subscription to stock of a non-profit
corporation organized to bring new industry into the community and
39. See note 18 supra.
40. Int Rev. Code of 1939, § 117(a) (1) (B), as amended, 64 Stat. 932
(1950) (now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1221(2)).
41. 163 F. 2d 283, 285 (1947). The taxpayer analogizes the loss on the
securities to the payment of a bonus to secure a lease, and thus an ordinary
business expense.
42. For cases on allocation of cost in other contexts, see, e.g., Kraft
Foods Co., 21 T. C. 513 (1954) ; C. D. Johnson Lumber Corp., 12 T. C. 348(1949) ; Transportation Service Associates, Inc., P-H 1944 T. C. Mem. Dec.
ff 44,036.
43. Exposition Souvenir Corp. v. Commissioner, 163 F. 2d 283, 286
(2d Cir. 1947).
44. 68 F. 2d 349 (4th Cir. 1934).
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to rehabilitate existing manufacturing plants. The taxpayer made
the payments for the purpose of indirectly benefiting his business
which was suffering along with other businesses in the community.
The court there allowed the deduction as an ordinary and necessary
expense analogizing the payments to advertising and donations.
Probably similar to this case, and not necessarily inconsistent with
it despite the opposite result, is Logan & Kanawha Coal Co.41 There
the petitioner was engaged in selling coal. It acquired shares of the
capital stock of certain coal-mining companies and a transportation
company for the primary' purposes of maintaining favorable rela-
tions and securing a supply of coal for the successful conduct of its
business. The taxpayer, in determining its excess profits tax for
the year 1941, treated the loss from the sale of certain of such shares
as an ordinary loss and treated its remaining shares as non-capital
assets in determining its invested and average invested capital.41
When the Commissioner attacked this treatment, the court held
such shares of stock constituted "capital assets" under Section 117
and hence "inadmissible" assets under Section 72 0(a) (1) (A). 4 7
The crucial element in the taxpayer's case may have been the
questionable business necessity connected with the purchase. At
any rate the court did not allow such tenuous business reasons to
transform the character of the securities into non-capital assets.
Possibly the court was afraid that if it allowed the deduction, it
would be opening the door to such claims whenever taxpayers hold-
ing interests in their suppliers or purchasers suffered a loss on their
purchase. Nevertheless, ten years later in 1955, the court allowed the
deduction in an analogous case 48 wherein the taxpayer purchased
debentures of his manufacturer-supplier of plywood lumber. Here
the court followed the trend of the most recent cases, and again
reiterated the reason as being "that business expense ... has been
many times determined by business necessity without a specific
consideration of Section 117," 4" and went on to say that insofar as
the Logan & Kanawha Coal case was inconsistent therewith it was
overruled.
45. 5 T. C. 1298 (1945).
46. Excess Profits Tax Act of 1940, §§ 714-19, 54 Stat. 981-85 (re-
pealed 59 Stat. 568 (1945)) provided for a credit based on invested capital.
47. Excess Profits Tax Act of 1940, § 720(a) (1) (A), as amended, 55
Stat. 29 (1941) (repealed 59 Stat. 568 (1945)). Section 720 provided that for
purposes of admissible and inadmissible assets-
"(1) The term 'inadmissible assets' means-
(A) Stock in corporations except stock in a foreign personal-holding
company; and except stock which is not a capital asset. . . ." (Such as stock
held primarily for sale to customers by a dealer in securities.)
48. Tulane Hardwood Lumber Co., 24 T. C. No. 129 (Sept. 30, 1955).
49. Id. at fI 24-633.
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SECURITIES ACQUIRED IN SUPPLIER CORPORATIONS TO
CIRCUMVENT OPA CEILING PRICES
In another category are the "OPA" cases, in which taxpayers
purchased stock in their supplier corporations in order that they
could obtain merchandise from them. The latest of these cases is
McGhee Uphlstery Co.,50 in which the tax-payer had difficulty
obtaining springs for the manufacture of furniture, and in order
to obtain them was required to buy $5,000 worth of the supplier
corporation stock. About a year after its purchase the stock was sold
back to the supplier corporation at a loss of $4,250, which loss was
then transferred from a "security" account to a "cost of goods sold"
account and deducted on the tax return as such. The court dis-
allowed the deduction upon the basis that nothing in the record
established this purchase and sale of stock as other than a capital
transaction. Again the court seemed to indicate that if the evidence
were sufficient they would allow the transaction as an ordinary
loss, but, on the other hand, the court was similarly concerned
with the proper year for deduction of the loss had they allowed it.
In two other "OPA" cases 51 the taxpayers purchased stock in
lumber supplier corporations at $100 per share for each 10,000
board feet of lumber purchased. The transferor of the stock had an
option to repurchase the stock at $1 per share, which option was
exercised a short time after the stock purchase. In both cases the
court said the payments were actually for the purchase of lumber,
'and although in violation of OPA ceilings were includible in the
cost of goods sold. Both of these cases cited Lela Suile,ger,52 in
which the court allowed over-ceiling payments for meat as part of
the cost of goods sold. The court arrived at the decision in that case
on the basis that the Sixteenth Amendment gave Congress the
power to tax no more than gross income. The Commissioner con-
tended the overpayment must be considered from the standpoint
of deductions which are a matter of grace and not of right, and to
allow these amounts as deductions would be contrary to public
policy."' The court, however, rejected his contention saying that
50. P-H 1954 T. C. Mem. Dec. 11 54,013.
51. Win. M. Young Co., P-H 1952 T. C Mere. Dec. 1 5250; Hoffman
Lumber Co., P-H 1952 T. C. Afem. Dec. ff 52,174
52. 11 T. C. 1076 (1948). However, in Harry Sackstein, 14 T. C. 566
(1950) where the petitioner was allowed to buy meat at OPA ceiling prices
in proportion to the amount of stock-purchased, the court said the payments
for stock were not part of the cost of goods sold, and not ordinary and neces-
sary expenses, but capital contributions by a stockholder.
53. Lela Sullenger, 11 T., C. 1076, 1077 (1948). However, in Commis-
sioner v. Pacific Mills, 207 F. 2d 177 (1st Cir. 1953), the court held that the
fundamental policy of the Emergency Price Control Act had not been
violated where a taxpayer entered into a settlement with the government
NOTES $ 591
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this was part of the cost of goods sold and, although Section 231"
makes no provision for the cost of goods sold, the Commissioner
must allow it in order to stay within the Constitution, and must
deduct the cost of goods sold from gross receipts to arrive at gross
income. Nevertheless, in other cases the court has not hesitated to
disallow the deduction by saying the evidence did not warrant such
an allowance.5 5 Thus the inconsistency in the OPA cases seems to
stem largely from the economic fact that these were expenses of
doing business on one hand, while, on the other hand allowing the
expenses would tend to uphold the inflation the OPA sought to
prevent.
SECURITIES ACQUIRED TO EXTINGUISH OUTSTANDING LIABILITIES
In another class of cases we have a situation where taxpayers, in
order to acquire assets or extinguish liabilities, have purchased
stock in other corporiitions. In Pressed Steel Car Co.50 the tax-
payer, in order to extinguish its liability under a contract, purchased
all of the stock of a corporation which held as assets only this
contract with the taxpayer purchaser; the taxpayer then dissolved
the corporation. The court in an earlier case allowed capital gains
treatment to the stockholders who were receivers of the payments,"'
but when the Commissioner cited the earlier holding in favor of
the stockholders as conclusive support for his position that the pay-
ment was for the purchase of stock, the Tax Court disagreed. It
saw the true nature of the event, would not be bound by the deter-
mination in the prior proceeding that the corporation had not
realized income, and thus found from the evidence that the expendi-
ture was clearly made to discharge the contract. Similarly the
amount paid by a corporation for stock of an agency in order to
procure cancellation of an agency contract for sale of the corpora-
tion's stock has been held to be deductible as an ordinary expense
or loss.
5 8
for overcharges made in good faith. The taxpayer was allowed to deduct
the settlement as ordinary and necessary business expense.
54. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23, as amended, 66 Stat. 443 (1952).
55. See McGhee Upholstery Co., P-H 1954 Mem. Dec. 1f 54,013; Hlarry
Sackstein, 14 T. C. 566 (1950); Solomon Jaeger, P-H 1950 Mere. Dec.
ff 50,306
56. 20 T. C. 198 (1953).
57. Armored Tank Corp., 11 T. C. 644 (1948).-
58. Helvering v. Community Bond & Mortgage Corp., 74 F. 2d 727 (2a
Cir. 1935). See also Camloc Fastener Co., 10 T. C. 1024 (1948), where a
damages settlement (in the form of a purchase of an agent's "interest") for
termination of a sales contract was allowed as an ordinary and necessary
business expense, and Olympia Harbor Lumber Company, 30 B. T. A. 114(1934), where a payment for cancellation of an unsatisfactory contract was
allowed similar treatment.
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NOTES
SECURITIES RECEIVED FOR GOODS OR SERVICES
In a final category are cases where securities are received as
payment for goods or services in lieu of some other form of pay-
ment. Such is Hercules Motors Corp.50 in which the taxpayer re-
ceived trade acceptances which matured at a later date with interest.
Likewise, ordinary loss treatment has been allowed where the tax-
payers received bonds in payment for services in lieu of cash, G0
and where stock was received by a contracting firm as payment for
constructing a building for a corporation. 1 Of the same nature is
The Foundation Co. case62 in which the taxpayer entered into a
contract with a Peruvian corporation and received as payment
Peruvian currency, which it was forced to sell at unfavorable ex-
change rates. In all of these cases the court found that the securities
or currency received was "property held primarily for sale to cus-
tomers in the ordinary course of trade or business" and thus excluded
it from the capital asset category0 3 The one case in this group that
seems to be ccimpletely irreconcilgalie with the others is Rockford
Varnish Co.64 in which secured notes were taken for accounts receiv-
able which had been received in the ordinary course of business. Here
the court held that the loss on such secured notes was a capital loss
inasmuch as the normal custom was not for this business to ,take
secured notes for accounts receivable. This seeming distinction led
to an outlandish result, since the entire income represented by the
notes had resulted from sales in the ordinary course of business.
However, such a case will presumably not arise again since, by the
addition of Section 1221(4) to the 1954 Code, such accounts and
notes receivable acquired in the ordinary course of trade or business
are specifically excluded from the capital asset category. 3
59. Hercules Motors Corp., 40 B. T. A. 999 (1939).
60. 47 B. T. A. 158 (1942).
61. Gilbert v. Commissioner, 56 F. 2d 361 (1st Cir. 1932). At the date
-of this case the "dealer" exclusion to the capital asset category still read,
'. . . property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale in the course of his
trade or business."
62. 14 T. C. 1333 (1950).
63. See also Lawyers Title Company of Missouri, 14 T. C. 1221 (1950),
where a title insurance company acting as escrow of funds advanced by
mortgagees on a building contract, acquired title to uncompleted buildings
and completed and sold them after the contractor had abandoned them. The
loss was held to be an ordinary loss under Section 117(a) (1). Contra,
Thompson Lumber Company, 43 B.T.A. 726 (1941).
64. 9 T. C. 171 (1947). Thompson Lumber Co., Supra note 63, arrived
at the same result, but the case involved real property, not securities.
65. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1221. "For purposes of this subtitle, the
term "capital asset" means property held by the taxpayer (whether or not
connected with his trade or business), but does not include-
(4) accounts or notes receivable acquired in the ordinary course of trade
or business for services rendered or from the sale of property described in
paragraph (1) ...."
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CONCLUSION
Fortunately, this area of the law seems to be one where bad
cases do not necessarily indicate bad law but merely that general rules,
designed to achieve salutary results in the great majority of situa-
tions, must sometimes be given absurd constructions to reach just
results when carried over into situations to which they were not
designed to apply. The courts have been confronted with the task
of solving problems that even a well-drafted statute, designed to
cover the situation, would make difficult to settle. They have had to
play a game of semantics coloring the securities as property held
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business,
or have had to resort to some other fiction.
The legislative history of the capital loss limitations shows a con-
gressional purpose to prevent capital loss deductions incurred over
several years from being taken all in one year, rather than a purpose
to restrict losses resulting from ordinary operations.0 0 Phrases such
as "ordinary and necessary," "held primarily for sale to customers,"
and "capital assets" refer to subtle categories which attempt to
separate the minute and infinite variations of income or loss pro-
ducing transactions, and such terms must of necessity be somewhat
misapplied in this area, since they are the words which have been
used to serve as the wall between the two types of gain or loss.
ordinary or capital.
Thus, although disposition of "capital assets" presents a difficult
problem, fairness in these cases, where the underlying purpose of
the security purchase is other than investment, would require that
losses of this type be reflected in taxable income to their full extent
as are non-investment losses of other types, e.g., losses sustained in
the operation of a business, and losses resulting from casualties such
as fire and flood.67 Consequently, the question arises as to what
should be done in circumstances where it becomes necessary to
acquire securities for some reason other than investment purposes,
and the holder wants to assure himself that a loss will be treated
in accordance with the purpose for which the securities were
purchased.
First, the taxpayer must thoroughly consider the element of
necessity involved in the acquisition of the securities. Is it to better
business relations, 8 or (foes the security purchase have a stronger
business purpose that is so closely akin to the regular conduct of
the business that without it normal operations would be virtually
66. See note 7 supra, and text thereto.
67. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 165(c).
68. See Logan & Kanawha Coal Co., 5 T. C. 1298 (1945).
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impossible? Courts are constantly in search of some long-range
profit motive or other reason to classify the securities as purchased
for investment rather than for ordinary business purposes. Conse-
quently, to expect ordinary loss treatment, taxpayers must have
extremely sound business-connected reasons for the purchase.
Secondly, the book treatment of the securities is very significant,
and the tax consciousness in this respect should begin immediately
upon acquisition. The taxpayer should enter the security purchase
in his books according to the purpose of the acquisition, and,
whether it be entered as an inventory item, additional consideration
to acquire an asset, or in some other way, no digression should be
made from that course in the bookkeeping.
Thirdly, the holding period is of considerable importance in
these cases. Securities should therefore be disposed of as soon as
their purpose in the underlying transaction has been fulfilled. In at
least two cases where the decisions against the taxpayers were
seemingly put on other grounds,69 the holding period was delayed
for a considerable length of time after the securities could have
been disposed of and still have accomplished their purpose. Again
it must be said this is not conclusive, but it seems to have carried
much weight with the courts.
Lastly, upon disposition of the securities, treatment consistent
with that employed upon their acquisition should be followed. Al-
though in the Bagley case the interest received was reported as in-
come it appears that a better method of handling any return that
may result from the securities would be to enter it as additional
consideration received on the over-all contract, or alternatively as
a reduction in the cost of the securities, thus reducing the cost of
goods or services sold. Likewise, the-loss on the disposition of the
securities should be treated consistently with the purpose behind
the purchase, whether it be as part of the cost of goods sold or as an
ordinary business expense, but at any rate in such a manner that it
is clear that no investment purpose is intended.
As to the most accurate method to follow in accounting for the
loss, at least one writer advocates the allocation of cost of the
securities between the -wanted and unwanted asset, in the case of
asset acquisitions along with the securities.70 Although the alloca-
tion method does have its problems and drawbacks, it appears that
this may be the best method for all such types of security acquisi-
69. Expbsition Souvenir Corp. v. Commissioner, 163 F. 2d 283 (2d Cir.
1947) ; McGhee Upholstery Co., P-H 1954 T. C. Mfex. Dec. 11 54,013.
70. SeeNote, 10 Tax L. Rev. 145, 155-157 (1954).
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tions. However, a revaluation annually so as to include the total
loss on the securities in the cost of goods sold or the cost of the indi-
vidual asset will usually be necessary to obtain an accurate result.
On the other hand, in cases where the acquisition was to extinguish
some outstanding liability, or where the securities have been ac-
quired for services, the classification of an ordinary and necessary
business expense seems to be the most realistic category for such
losses, since it is clear in these cases that the acquisition was to
further the ordinary course of business either by reducing liabilities
or by securing additional income through ordinary sales. These sug-
gestions, although not necessarily determinative of the result courts
nhay reach in the future, should be persuasive evidence of a tax-
payer's intentions in acquiring and holding non-investment securi-
ties.
Nevertheless, the present method of handling such losses on
secirities acquired for other than investment purposes results ill a
somewhat unsatisfactory and unpredictable guide to the future. It is
hoped that courts will turn to the rationale of the United States
Supreme Court in Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner."
which involves a hedging rather than a security transaction as a
normal part of operations. In that case the Court said:
"Admittedly, petitioner's corn futures do not come within the
literal language of the exclusions set out in that section 1117 1.
They were not stock in trade, actual inventory, property held
for sale to customers or depreciable property used in a trade or
business. But the capital-asset provision of § 117 must not be
so broadly applied as to defeat rather than further the pur-
pose of Congress .... Congress intended that profits and losses
arising from the everyday operation of a business be con-
sidered as ordinary income or loss rather than capital gain or
loss. The preferential treatment provided by § 117 applies to
transactions in property which are not the normal source of
business income. It was intended 'to relieve the taxpayer from
... excessive tax burdens on gains resulting from a conversion
of capital investments, and to remove the deterrent effect of
those burdens on such conversions.' . . . [S]ince this section is
an exception from the normal tax requirements of the Internal
Revenue Code, the definition of a capital asset must be narrowly
applied and its exclusions interpreted broadly. This is necessary
to effectuate the basic congressional purpose. '7 2
If courts follow this line of reasoning for gains and losses on iioii-
investment securities, it appears that justice will be done when cases
71. 350 U. S. 46 (1955).
72. Id. at 51-52.
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reach litigation. However, although the results courts have reached
to date indicate a clear appreciation of particular situations, a fresh
approach appears to be vitally needed wherein the legislature or the
Commissioner can spell out for tax planners the requirements of
this judicially created exception to Section 1221.73
73. Formerly Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117, as amended, 64 Stat. 932
(1950).
